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  • order CMX001 Aside from the obvious physical damage the atta

    2018-11-05

    Aside from the obvious physical damage the attacks incurred, acts of terrorism have been shown to have an immediate and longer-term negative effect on order CMX001 mental health (Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin & Gil-Rivas, 2002; Whalley & Brewin, 2007). This may be the result of two mechanisms: (i) the indiscriminate nature of acts of terrorism themselves and the subsequent collective climate of fear (O’Driscoll, 2008), and (ii) by negatively impacting on levels of social capital (Blomberg, Hess & Tan, 2011), a resource which has been empirically shown to act as a buffer against poor mental health outcomes (Ehsan & De Silva, 2015; Lindström & Giordano, 2016; McPherson et al., 2014; Whitley & McKenzie, 2005). To expand and clarify, past research shows that whole populations, not just those individuals in the immediate vicinity of such events, suffer from worse mental health outcomes after such traumatic events (Silver et al., 2002; Whalley & Brewin, 2007). Though the former are more likely to recover faster (Knudsen, Roman, Johnson & Ducharme, 2005), there appears to be a minority who continue to display negative mental health symptoms, despite not having been in close geographic proximity to the terror incident (Whalley & Brewin, 2007). The relationship between social capital and terrorism appears more complex. Social capital is considered both an individual and collective resource (Berkman & Kawachi, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000). It is often defined in terms of social networks, norms of reciprocation and trust (Putnam, 2004), and has been considered a public good, providing positive externalities (unintended benefits) for all (Putnam, 2000). This rather simplistic idea is open to critique, however, one pertinent example being how the role of social capital (in understanding the potential for acts of terrorism) can be succinctly argued as both a restraint and a catalyst (Helfstein, 2014). It is of greater interest to us, however, to investigate if such terror atrocities may have impacted on levels of social capital, measured by generalised trust and active participation in this study. The presence of social capital has been hypothesised to buffer against poor mental health by reducing levels of perceived psychological stress (Kawachi, Kennedy & Glass, 1999). High levels of stress have been shown to increase blood cortisol levels, which in turn, have been linked to deleterious health outcomes, including worse mental health (Roy & Campbell, 2013; Watson & Mackin, 2006). Any reduction in social capital after the terror attacks in 2005, therefore, may further compound the effects of terrorism on mental health outcomes. Of the two social capital proxies utilised in this study, generalised trust levels (trust in strangers) may be negatively impacted by a collective climate of fear after the 2005 terror attacks (O’Driscoll, 2008), compounded possibly by the breaking news that the four suicide bombers were ‘home-grown’ middle-class British citizens (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005b). Another theory suggests that specific political responses to terrorism that include increased vigilance, security and order CMX001 control could further erode both generalised and institutional trust (Barker, 2005; Furedi, 2005; Hobbes, 1996). In the case of the UK in 2005, the immediate shoot-to-kill remit of the Metropolitan police force and the rapid draughting of the Terrorism Act are two such policy examples that may negatively affect trust. Levels of local active social participation (our second social capital proxy) could be negatively affected by terrorism, any climate of fear translating into individuals feeling too concerned or even intimidated to venture out more than deemed essential (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005c). Conversely, local active participation (in the form of peaceful anti-terrorism demonstration, for example) may increase, as a way to express shared emotions and to reinforce positive social norms and beliefs (Paez, Basabe, Ubillos & Gonzalez-Castro, 2007). Social participation in this study is captured by individuals’ active (not passive) membership in local groups, organisations or leisure activities (see appendix for a full list). Increased active participation, as defined here, may help reverse any downward trend in trust (Putnam, 2000) and could also have positive effects on psychological wellbeing through increasing social ties and (re-establishing) community integration (Kawachi & Berkman, 2001).